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China has been carrying out significant fiscal reforms on intergovernmental fiscal relations 
for over three decades. However, these reforms have largely concentrated on the revenue side of 
the budget, and generally have not been coordinated with an explicit strategy for the reform of 
functional expenditure assignments. Currently, there is large consensus that the weaknesses with 
the current assignment of expenditure responsibilities have become one of the most serious ob-
structions---if not the most serious---to the further improvement of China fiscal system. In this 
paper, we provide a comprehensive review of the actual practice with expenditure assignment 
among different levels of government in China over the past decades. We highlight the most im-
portant issues surrounding the current system qualitatively and quantitatively, and provide a road 




China has been carrying out significant reforms on intergovernmental fiscal 
relations for over three decades. However, these reforms have largely concentrat-
ed on the revenue side of the budgets, and generally have not been coordinated 
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with an explicit strategy for the reform of expenditure assignments. Although sig-
nificant strides have been made in the areas of tax assignments and tax admin-
istration, other areas and, in particular the assignment of expenditure responsibili-
ties, have seen much less progress. And yet, a stable, efficient and fair decentral-
ized system of public finance in China will require an unambiguous and well de-
fined institutional framework that provides clarity and certainty in the assignment 
of expenditure responsibilities among the different levels of government. The as-
signment of responsibilities is by no means the only condition, but it is the most 





This paper reviews the most important current issues surrounding the assign-
ment of expenditure responsibilities in China.
3
 The rest of the paper is organized 
as follows. In section 2, we discuss in some detail the current practices of ex-
penditure assignments among different levels of government in China. In section 
3 we analyze the main issues and problems with current assignments in China. In 
section 4 we provide a road map and practical recommendations for the reform of 
expenditure assignments in China. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. AN OVERVIEW OF EXPENDITURE ASSIGNMENT IN CHINA 
 
An important feature of China’s vertical structure of government is the strong 
hierarchical link between the different levels of government. Currently, there are 
five levels of governments in China. Starting from the top these levels are: the 
center, provinces, prefectures and prefecture-level cities (hereafter, cities), coun-
ties, and townships. Under the current hierarchical system, each subnational level 
of government is wholly subordinate to the next higher order of government, and 
so the intergovernmental fiscal relationships are typically defined and implement-
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 See Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez (2006a) for a discussion of the sequencing of decentralization 
reforms. 
3
 See, for example, Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez (2006b) for a wider perspective of decentraliza-
tion reform in China.  
4
 Over the last decade, the central government has been encouraging the “province-managing-
county” reform under which the provincial government directly (and separately) manages the cit-
ies (prefectures) and counties. In this reform there are direct intergovernmental relations between 
the provincial government and the city (prefecture) government, and separately between the pro-
vincial government and the county government in all aspects of intergovernmental relations, in-
cluding revenue assignments, expenditure assignments, intergovernmental transfers, special subsi-
dies, final account subsidy, borrowing and adjustment of budgetary funds. This reform was for-
mally initiated in some provinces around 2004, and the reform was widely carried out across the 








Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2012 
 
The reforms in the fiscal arrangements over the last three decades mainly in-
volved the fiscal relations between the central government and provincial gov-
ernments. The latter act as representatives of the entire sub-national government 
sector in each provincial jurisdiction and engage directly in negotiations and bar-
gaining with the central government. The provinces continue to play a fundamen-
tal role in balancing the fiscal relations between the central government and all 
sub-national governments. In contrast, the fiscal relations between the provincial 
level and all other sub-national governments have been much less developed, and 
it is mostly determined at the discretion of the provincial governments. 
 
2.1 Extensive Government Responsibilities: Differentiating between Private 
and Public Sector Activities 
 
One question prior to the assignment of expenditure responsibilities among 
different levels of government is the role of government in the market economy. 
The lack of a clear delineation between the roles of the private and public sectors 
in China significantly complicates the issue of expenditure responsibilities. While 
many countries, and especially transitional countries, have undergone in recent 
decades massive privatization of state and local enterprises involved in what can 
                                                                   
nation. By the end of 2009, 22 provinces in China had commenced reform on a pilot basis (Liu et 
al. 2011). 
5
 The dashed line represents the practice of “province-managing-county” reform that was imple-
mented in some of the provinces in China.  
22 provinces, 5 autonomous regions, 4 
special municipalities 
284 cities, 48 prefectures 
857 districts, 369 county cities, 1573 
counties 
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be considered private-sector economic activities, this has not been generally the 
case in China.  Even though there has been some privatization in China, this pro-
cess has yet to begin in earnest in many areas of the economy.   
 
On the other hand, there have been some visible efforts in government to re-
define the role of the public sector more along the conventional lines commonly 
seen in market economies. For example, in 1998, the State Council initiative to 
build a Public Finance Framework for government focused on the encouragement 
of the fundamental function of markets in the allocation of resources in the econ-
omy while it provided more space for fiscal policies to meet the demand for pub-
lic goods and services while gradually decreasing the role of fiscal inputs in the 
competitive sectors of the economy. Along these same lines, in 2006, the Com-
munist Party proposed the equalization of basic public services across the country 
as a way to further build the Public Finance Framework. This initiative resulted in 
the allocation of additional fiscal resources to the social security system, educa-
tion (particularly through the rural compulsory education program), health care, 
and rural support. The central government has also begun to use fiscal policies for 
macroeconomic management. In particular, with the experiences of the 1998 
Asian financial crisis and the 2008 global financial crisis, the central government 




2.2 Highly Decentralized Responsibilities for Basic Public Services with Wide 
Concurrent Expenditure Responsibilities 
 
On the more specific subject of expenditure assignments, the Budget Law con-
fers quite broad expenditure responsibilities and substantial autonomy to each 
level of sub-national government. However, expenditure assignments are far from 
being transparent and clear, mostly because of the lack of formal assignments and 
the presence of extensive concurrent functions among different levels of govern-
ment (World Bank, 2002). This pervasive presence of concurrent responsibilities 
can be traced back to the planned economy era. At that time, it was not considered 
necessary to separate the responsibilities of different spheres of government as 
providers of public services (as local governments acted as agents of the central 
government---only carrying out assigned tasks), nor was it considered necessary 
                         
6
In particular, the central government implemented aggressive fiscal policies in 1998 to stimulate 
the economy, and changed to more steady fiscal policies in 2004 as the main sector of the econo-
my improved. The central government adopted an aggressive fiscal policy stand again in 2008 to 
deal with the global financial and economic crisis. In addition, the central government has contin-
ued to focus on the implementation of national development strategies, including the promotion of 
domestic demand, improving equity in income distribution, and changing the growth model for the 
country. 




to separate the expenditure responsibilities of governments from those of state-
owned enterprises (SOEs). The latter was due to the cohesive functions of the 
government in both the public and private sectors; in fact, before the mid-1980s 
government jointly determined fiscal expenditures and the expenses of the SOEs.   
 
The recent reforms, including the “Fiscal Responsibility System Reform” start-
ing at the beginning of the 1980s, the “Fiscal Contracting System” starting in 
1988, and the “Tax Sharing System Reform” (TSS) starting in 1994, offer the 
striking feature of having put almost exclusive emphasis on improving the reve-
nue assignments and transfer system. But these reforms have practically ignored 
the question of expenditure assignments.
7
 This means that there has been no ap-
parent change in either the policy framework or the practice of expenditure as-
signments between the central government and sub-national governments or 
among sub-provincial government since even before the start of the market-
oriented reforms in the late 1970s.  
 
More in particular, the 1994 TSS reform restated the pre-reform expenditure 
assignment practices and provided only basic guidelines for defining expenditure 
responsibilities between central and sub-national governments. These guidelines 
illustrate that both the central government and local governments not only have 
extensive expenditure responsibilities, but that these responsibilities widely over-
lap and that additionally are only vaguely defined. For example, The State Coun-
cil Regulations on the Implementation of the TSS defined expenditure responsi-
bilities of central and local governments as follows: 
 
“Central budgets are mainly responsible for national security, inter-
national affairs, the running costs of the central government, the needs 
for adjusting the structure of national economy, coordinating regional 
development, adjusting and controlling the macro economy, and oth-
ers. Detail items include: national defense, cost of military police, in-
ternational affairs and foreign aid, administration costs of the central 
government, central financed capital investments, the technical reno-
vation of central enterprises and new product development costs, the 
costs of support to agriculture, debt, and the costs of central culture, 
education, and health, price subsidies and other expenditures. 
 
Local budgets are mainly responsible for the running costs of local 
government, and the needs for local social economic development. De-
tail items include: running costs of local government, the needs of lo-
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cal economic development, a part of the running costs of the military 
police and militia, locally financed capital investments, the technical 
renovation of local enterprises and new product development costs, 
the costs of support to agriculture, urban maintenance and construc-
tion, and the costs of local culture, education, and health, price subsi-
dies and other expenditures.” 
 
Fundamentally, responsibilities exclusive to the central government and ex-
clusive to the sub-national governments are few. The central government tends to 
be exclusively responsible for national defense issues and local governments pro-
vide basically all local public services, such as urban maintenance. Moreover, as 
the sub-national governments are treated in some ways as the agents of the central 
government, this has allowed the decentralization to sub-national governments, 
particularly at the county-level, of public services such as social security or food 
safety, that in other countries are typically reserved as central government respon-
sibilities. Meanwhile, the central government, by constitutional design, can be in-
volved in any sub-national function. Thus, as long as a local issue---for example, 
the rural toilet reconstruction program---is brought up to the central authorities, 
this responsibility instantly can become a central government’s responsibility.  
 
Although all sub-national governments at different levels have many overlap-
ping expenditure responsibilities, in practice the main responsibilities for some 
basic public services including basic education and health care are concentrated at 
the county and township levels of governments, while some other public services 
such as social security are concentrated at the provincial and prefecture levels of 
governments; however, even here county level governments in 2009 were respon-
sible for 42% of expenditures on the social safety net and unemployment insur-
ance (Table 1). In the following paragraphs, we discuss in some detail the most 
important assignments. 
 
Table 1. Share of Each Government Level by Expenditure Type in 2009 
  Central Provincial Prefecture County Township % 
Total 
Foreign affairs 97.4 1.2 0.7 0.6 0 0.3 
National defense 97.3 0.9 1 0.7 0 4.9 
Financial affairs 91.5 3.7 3.7 1.1 0 1.6 
Payments on government 
bonds 
88.5 3.5 6.2 1.7 0 1.5 
Science and technology 51.5 17.7 16 13.7 1 2.8 
Reserve for cereals and 
oils 
34.8 28.6 12.5 22.4 1.7 6.6 




Transportation 28.9 42.9 15.2 12.7 0.4 2.2 
Affordable housing 25.7 24.3 40.5 9.4 0.1 0.1 
Mining, quarrying, elec-
tricity and IT 
22.2 17.5 32.6 23.9 3.9 4.8 
Public security 17.4 18.5 28.9 34.1 1 2.2 
Culture, sport and media 16.7 27.4 28.4 25.4 2.1 3.6 
Other expenditure 19.3 23.1 27 26.5 4.1 3.6 
Urban and rural communi-
ty affairs 
1.1 5.6 46.8 42.2 4.3 9.7 
Social safety net and em-
ployment 
5.4 20.5 27.4 42 4.7 12.9 
General public services 11.3 18.3 21.4 36.1 12.8 8.5 
Environment protection 1.9 21.5 26.6 46.9 3 4.2 
Agricultural and water 
conservancy 
6.5 24.3 14.8 45.3 9 2 
Education 6.7 18.4 19.3 50.3 5.4 19.4 
Post-earthquake recovery  10.4 21.6 10.6 53.1 4.3 7.7 
Medical and healthcare 1.5 14.8 25.4 55.9 2.5 1.3 
All types of expenditure 18.1 17.3 25 35.1 4.6 100 
Source: Local Fiscal Statistical Yearbook 2010. 
 
Education: Fundamentally education is the responsibility of sub-national gov-
ernments. Education services can be divided into basic education, higher educa-
tion, and vocational education. Vocational education has been mostly left to pri-
vate market institutions in China.
8
 For basic education, the role of the central gov-
ernment is that of the policy-maker and overall planner. In addition, the central 
government has responsibility for setting up special education funds for subsidiz-
ing basic education and teachers’(or normal) education in poor, minority areas. 
The provincial government has the overall responsibility for formulating the de-
velopment plan for basic education and for providing assistance to counties to 
help them meet recurrent expenditures in education. The responsibility for actual-
ly implementing compulsory education programs, including financing basic edu-
cation, lies with the cities or districts of large cities in the case of urban areas and 
with counties in the case of rural areas. 
 
The provision of basic education services in rural areas is one of the major 
current concerns for the central government because of the generally worse ser-
vice conditions there, especially in poor rural areas. Some new initiatives, espe-
cially the Decision of Strengthening Rural Education, issued by the State Council 
                         
8
See the “Implementation Suggestions of the State Council on the Guidelines for the Reform and 
Development of Education in China” issued in July 1994. 
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in September 2003 expanded the expenditure responsibilities of the central gov-
ernment on basic education. This basic service was defined as a shared responsi-
bility with the goal of supporting students from poor families by waiving their 
textbook, tuition, and miscellaneous fees, and by subsidizing housing expendi-
tures for elementary and secondary education students. The central government as 
well as sub-national governments started setting up special funds for the support 
of this program in 2003. All students who meet the requirements of the poverty 
standard were supposed to enjoy the listed benefits by 2006. 
 
The assignment of expenditure responsibilities for higher education differs 
from that of basic education. In general, private institutions of higher education in 
China are few and they account for a very small portion of these services; private 
institutions tend to concentrate on vocational training. Public higher education 
institutions are divided into two groups: one belongs to the central government, 
and the other belongs to sub-national governments; thus, expenditure responsibili-
ties for higher education are shared between the central government and the pro-
vincial governments. The central government has responsibility for the plan of 
national development of higher education, and provides direct support to a select 
group of higher education organizations. The provincial governments have re-
sponsibility for the plans of provincial development of higher education and pro-
vide support the higher education of provincial institutions. 
 
Health care: The central government has continued to commit to its responsi-
bilities for health care. As a policy objective the central government has deter-
mined that total public spending on health care --from both the central and sub-
national governments-- needs to increase at a higher growth rate than that of gen-
eral budgetary expenditures. In practice, the responsibilities for public healthcare 
are concentrated at the sub-national level, particularly at the county and below 
levels of government. 
 
The major concern of the central government about health care in China con-
tinues to be the spotty service coverage in rural areas. The Decision to Strengthen 
Rural Health Care issued by the central authorities in October 2002 provided de-
tailed responsibilities for the provision of rural health care services among differ-
ent levels of governments. The central government now has the responsibility for 
designing the overall plan for rural public health care, the provincial government 
has responsibility for planning its implementation, and the county (city) govern-
ments are assigned the overall responsibility for rural public healthcare delivery. 
In addition, the central government has the responsibility of subsidizing programs 
for the prevention and control of infectious disease, endemic diseases, occupa-
tional diseases, and so on, in poorer areas; provincial governments have responsi-




bility for subsidizing health programs of county (city) governments and to pay for 
the costs of planned immunity vaccinations. Finally, county (city) governments 




The new initiative of building a new rural collaborative health care system got 
started in January 2003, and it expanded the responsibilities of both the central 
government and local governments regarding health care. It established among 
other measures that from 2003 on the central government should pay US$ 1.20 a 
year for each rural resident in the central and western regions who joins the rural 
collaborative health care system. Meanwhile, sub-national governments need to 
pay no less than US$ 1.20 a year in total for each rural resident who joins the rural 
collaborative health care system, leaving it to the discretion of provincial govern-
ments to arrange the sharing into this contribution among the different sub-
national levels. 
 
Social security: This expenditure category in China refers to a package of 
programs which includes pensions, health insurance, unemployment insurance, 
maternity insurance, occupational injury insurance, and a variety of other health 
and welfare programs. The social security programs are mainly the responsibility 
of the city and county governments and are managed through a separate local 
government fund. Its financing is based on payroll tax contributions and on gov-
ernment subsidies. The system is generally underfunded, and is beset with a lega-
cy of deficits. When responsibilities for social security payments of former SOE 
workers were passed on to the local governments, shortfalls emerged in govern-
ment budgets. This left the local governments with unfunded social security liabil-
ities and numerous “empty” accounts. The changing age distribution in China will 
likely worsen the financial condition of this program (World Bank and Develop-
ment Research Center, 2014).  
 
The current division of the main expenditure responsibilities among the dif-
ferent levels of government is summarized in Table 2. 
 
Table 2.Expenditure Assignment among Different Levels of Government 
 Central Provincial Prefecture County and 
below 
National Defense √ √   
Foreign Affairs √ √   
Foreign Aid √ √   
                         
9
See “Decision on Public Health Reform and Development by the Central Government” issued in 
January 
1997. 
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Capital Investment  √ √ √ √ 
Government Administration √ √ √ √ 
Education √ √ √ √ 
Scientific Research √ √ √ √ 
Social Security √ √ √ √ 
Health Care √ √ √ √ 
Agriculture Expenditure √ √ √ √ 
Expenditure for Public Security 
Agency, Procuratorial Agency and 
Court of Justice 
√ √ √ √ 
Urban Maintenance and Construc-
tion  
 √ √ √ 
Source: Authors’ summary 
 
An important feature of expenditure assignments in practice is that traditional-
ly actual expenditures at the sub-provincial government in China have followed a 
pattern of first meeting current spending needs. Currently, the predominant ex-
penditure pattern at the county level in poorer areas is still regarded as one of 
“feeding finance”(Chi Fan Cai Zheng) or just meeting government administration 
costs. The relative shares of components in total expenditure at different levels are 
shown in Table 1 above for 2009.  
 
All in all, the level of expenditure decentralization in China is among the 
highest in the world, with about 85% of the total being the responsibility of sub-
national governments in 2012. The trend has been increasing one toward expendi-
ture decentralization. For example, in 2001 the sub-national government share in 
total public expenditures was just a bit over 65%. One reason for this trend is that 
the most expensive and income elastic expenditures, such as education, health 
care and social welfare, are still mostly the responsibility of sub-national govern-
ments. 
 
2.3 Hierarchical Expenditure Managing Model 
 
Put in perspective, the reforms of intergovernmental fiscal relations over the 
last two decades have contributed significantly to improving local autonomy in 
China. In particular, nowadays each sub-national government has its own budget. 
More specifically, the budget of each government includes its own budget and the 
consolidated budget, which includes its own budget and all the consolidated 
budgets of the governments at the next lower level.
10
 The government budget at 
each level is approved by the people’s congress at that level; in addition, the peo-
ple’s congress at each government level also checks the consolidated budget. The 
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For the lowest government level, the townships, the own budget is equivalent to the consolidated 
budget. 




approved own budget of a sub-national government is submitted to the upper gov-
ernment, and so on to the MOF for the record and for the compilation of the upper 
level government’s consolidated budget and eventually the national consolidated 
budget. The national budget is the last to be approved. 
 
However, on the other hand, local residents have little input into shaping the 
content of local budgets. Instead, local expenditure management has been con-
ducted mostly through the bureaucratic hierarchy, a common practice that still 
remains. In addition, also reducing actual autonomy, the legal system framing 
China’s fiscal decentralization process still gives provincial authorities complete 
discretion to overturn and finally determine all budget decisions of sub-provincial 
governments.  
 
At the same time, the central government has increasingly provided guidelines 
for local expenditure management although much of it has helped clarify expendi-
ture assignments in practice. A sampling of these regulations includes the follow-
ing. The State Council Regulations on the Implementation of the TSS 1994 reform 
required provincial governments to define the expenditure responsibilities for sub-
provincial governments. The Suggestions on Improving the Fiscal Management 
System in Counties and Townships Experimenting with Rural Tax-Fee Reform by 
MOF in August 2000 required: (a) a clear definition of expenditure responsibili-
ties between the county and township governments; (b) the improvement of the 
structure of township government, and strict control of the quota of township em-
ployees; and (c) the monitoring of fiscal risks of county and township govern-
ments. The Notice about Eliminating Fiscal Difficulties of County and Township 
Government by MOF in 2005 tried to build a monitoring and expenditure perfor-
mance system.  
 
3. MAIN ISSUES WITH THE CURRENT SYSTEM OF EXPENDITURE 
ASSIGNMENT 
 
As already mentioned above, expenditure assignments have been largely ig-
nored by the central government in the last three decades of intergovernmental 
fiscal relations reform in China. The basic assignments of expenditure at the dif-
ferent levels of government are today fundamentally what they were decades ago 
at the start of the reforms. With the increase in the demand for public services as-
sociated with the fast process of industrialization and urbanization and the chang-
es in technologies to deliver those services, the demand for public services has 
drastically changed and yet little has been done to reform service delivery policies 
over the past several decades. These issues are especially acute at the sub-
provincial level. 
12 International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series 
 
 
This lack of reform on expenditure assignments is striking given that the de-
centralization in China is fundamentally one-sided-- from the expenditure side of 
the budget-- and that expenditure decentralization in China is very extensive by 
any international standards, with about 85% of total public expenditures being the 
responsibility of sub-national governments in 2013. And the trend has been to-
ward the increase of expenditure decentralization. For example, in 2001 the sub-
national government share in total public expenditures was just a bit over 65%. 
Because of the lack of reform and some fundamental structural weaknesses of the 
system, the current system of expenditure assignments still faces a series of prob-
lems,
11
 which would be best addressed via a comprehensive reform. In what fol-
lows we discuss some of the more important issues in more detail.  
 
3.1 Lack of a Clear Assignment of Expenditure Responsibilities and Its Con-
sequences  
 
The overall efficiency of the system of intergovernmental fiscal relations has 
been handicapped by the lack of clarity in the current functional assignments in 
the laws and regulations. As stressed above, recent reforms have made little pro-
gress in bringing clarity.   
 
The lack of explicit expenditure assignments has eventually led to lower ac-
countability given the difficulty of identifying the level of government that is ac-
tually responsible for the delivery of particular services. Lower accountability 
means in turn that local governments are likely not prioritizing local budget ex-
penditures according to the needs and preferences of their residents or delivering 
those services with the lowest possible costs (Oates 1972; 2004). Accountability 
of government officials to residents has been further reduced because an increas-
ing number of people have migrated internally without the official documents (i.e., 
Hukou registration) and have been residing in urban areas, especially in the east-
ern provinces, without a right to access basic services.  
 
The lack of explicit assignments has produced in particular considerable 
murkiness as to which level is responsible for financing expenditures and how the 
financing responsibilities are divided. This has facilitated often the “convenient” 
offloading of responsibilities down the hierarchical structure of government. In 
education, for example, despite the fact that in many cases there are inadequate 
resources, counties have been called in recent years to finance basic education 
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 Nevertheless, we have to acknowledge that the design of any system of expenditure assignments 
is a complex matter, and in practice very few countries are able to get it right, especially when the 
decentralized system of finance is still fairly new in a country, as is the case in China. 






The lack of explicit assignments has also led to significant differences in the 
assignment of responsibilities among local governments across provinces. Alt-
hough in theory there is nothing wrong with having a variety of approaches to ex-
penditure assignments, the absence of a holistic approach to expenditure (and rev-
enue) assignments at the sub-provincial level has made it more difficult for 
matching revenue sources with expenditure functions at each local level. In addi-
tion, the vast array of arrangements has made it almost impossible to target pass-
through transfers from the central government to lower-level local governments 
and to set standards for the provision and performance monitoring of public ser-
vices. This is evidenced by the fact that in the current transfers system, the alloca-
tion of funds has to go through the different layers of government from the top to 
the bottom. All these aspects have contributed to a wide variation in the standards 
of services across the country. 
 
The lack of a legal framework for expenditure assignments at the sub-
provincial level has also allowed for high levels of administrative discretion in 
ultimately deciding which level of government is responsible for service delivery. 
In practice, upper-level government decisions regarding expenditure responsibili-
ties have resulted in what can be regarded in many cases unfunded government 
mandates. Consequently, local residents may have to settle for a subpar level of 
services. For example, pensions may be underfunded and full payments may not 
be made to retirees. Or, a provincial government with responsibility for regulating 
the production of foodstuffs for national consumption may choose not to impose 
costly food inspection measures, with this decision potentially having adverse ef-
fects on the welfare of the whole country.  
 
One last consequence of the lack of explicit expenditure assignment has been 
the continued blurred distinction between public and private activities, with no 
clear delineation for what are government functions vis-à-vis those to be carried 
out by the private sector. During the process of transition from the planned econ-
omy to the market economy, government has gradually relied more heavily on 
market mechanisms and has given up direct intervention in the private sector. 
However, government’s expenditure responsibilities within the private sector are 
still very wide. Currently, a significant number of enterprises are still owned by 
(or belong to) governments at different levels, and there is still a variety of chan-
nels through which governments can directly or indirectly encroach into private-
sector activities through their SOEs (Qiao and Shah 2006). A typical example of 
this is that local governments may use transfers to support the activities of SOEs, 
which ultimately affects the market competitive outcomes. Even in the poorer ar-
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eas, the limited fiscal resources have not prevented local governments from ex-
panding into areas with heavy overhead expenditures that in many other countries 
are entirely left to the private sector. This expansion into market economic activi-
ties has depleted fiscal resources leaving fewer funds available for the provision 
of even the most basic public services.  
 
3.2 A Mismatch of Expenditure Responsibilities and Revenue Sources at the    
Lowest Levels of Administration 
 
Local governments (especially county and township levels) have very heavy 
expenditure responsibilities in education, health, and social security that are out of 
line, especially in the case of social security, with international practice. While the 
TSS reform re-centralized revenue assignments, there has been considerable de-
volution of expenditure responsibilities to local governments. The potential dis-
connect between the revenue and expenditure pillars of fiscal decentralization is 
illustrated in Figure 2 by the sharp decline in the share of the sub-national gov-
ernment in total government revenues after 1994 and the fact that not much after 
the share of the sub-national government in total expenditures started to rise. 
More importantly, the vertical imbalances caused by the opposite trends in reve-
nue centralization and expenditure decentralization have not been adequately off-
set by intergovernmental transfers (Zhang and Martinez-Vazquez, 2003; Jia, 
2004). 
 
This situation has led to a serious under-provision of basic public services in 
poor jurisdictions. For county governments that have only limited revenues, the 
ability to spend on local public goods depends heavily upon the availability of 
intergovernmental transfers (Uchimura and Jütting 2009; Liu et al. 2014). But 
with the current levels of intergovernmental transfers coupled with the budget 
priority decisions taken by many local governments (e.g., their forays into private 
sector activities just discussed above) have led in many cases to the under-
provision of basic public services (Martinez-Vazquez et al., 2008).  
 
The bottom line is that China’s system of intergovernmental finance is far 
from achieving the goal of providing all citizens with similar access to basic pub-
lic services. As shown in Table 3, while the average per capita educational ex-
penditure in year 2000 is 159.49 Yuan, the poorest jurisdiction spends only 77.54 
Yuan, less than half of the national average and less that one seventh of that spent 
by the richest in this same year. The under provision in some areas of health care 
services and social security are even more significant. The poorest jurisdiction 
spends 18.10 Yuan per capita on health care in year 2000, which represents 35% 
of the national average and only 8.6% of what is spent by the richest jurisdiction. 




For the case of social security programs, the lowest jurisdiction spends 8.41 Yuan 
per capita on the subsidies for social security programs in year 2000, which repre-
sents 41% of the national average and only 10% of what is spent by the richest 
jurisdiction. Importantly, however, Table 3 also reveals positive evidence that, 
over the years there has been convergence; by 2012, the lag of poorer provinces in 
providing basic public services had been reduced, though quantitatively, the re-
gional gaps are still large.  
 
Figure 2. Trends of Sub-national Government Shares in Total Reve-
nues/Expenditures 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbooks 
 
Table 3.  Sub-national Expenditures on Basic Public Services, Per Capita 
(2000 and 2012) 
 Year Min Max Mean C.V. 
Total 2000 469.57  3783.41  1080.72  0.72  
2012 5322.56  29394.16  10141.51  0.52  
Education 2000 77.54  583.05  159.49  0.68  
2012 1176.39  3067.53  1722.14  0.33  
Health Care 2000 18.10  209.17  51.27  0.91  
2012 436.66  1237.60  614.68  0.33  
Social Secu-
rity 
2000 8.41  81.70  20.39  0.69  
2012 547.71  3132.81  1132.90  0.51  













Sub-national Expenditure as a % of Total Government Expenditure
Sub-national Revenue as a % of Total Government Revenue
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3.3 Inefficient Assignment of Several Expenditure Responsibilities 
 
Several of the current de facto expenditure assignments are highly problemat-
ic. The most conspicuous example is the major responsibility assigned to sub-
national governments for social security programs including pensions, unem-
ployment insurance and income support schemes for city- and county-level gov-
ernments. This illustrated in Figure 3, where, on average, sub-national govern-
ments have taken up more than 93% of the total expenditure responsibilities not 
only for education and health care but also for social security.  
 
Figure 3. Trends of Sub-national Government Shares in Total Expenditures 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbooks 
 
Such assignments for social security are hardly replicated anywhere else in the 
world. In general, pension schemes, unemployment insurance, and other social 
security measures tend to be central government responsibilities, as these types of 
schemes require a high level of risk pooling and redistribution that cannot be 
matched at the level of county governments.
12
 Therefore, either provincial or na-
tional pooling of social risks would seem to be the correct approach to these func-
tional assignments. Beyond the implied inefficiencies, there are also significant 
distributional consequences. Whereas welfare benefits are almost nonexistent in 
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some rural areas, in some urban areas there is often a lack of redistribution be-
cause poorer communities with the highest needs are the least financially able to 
fund these expenditures. The inability of many local governments to finance their 
social safety nets has led in recent years to the widespread presence of pension 





3.4 Significant Horizontal Expenditure Disparities Across and Within Prov-
inces 
 
As we highlighted above, the lack of explicit assignments has led to signifi-
cant differences in the assignment of responsibilities among local governments 
across provinces. In turn, this has in part contributed to significant horizontal fis-
cal disparities both across provinces and within provinces. The significant dispari-
ties in expenditure per capita and in service delivery are likely to be harmful for 
cohesion of the country. Here we review the main trends in expenditure dispari-
ties across and within provinces and more importantly, we exam-
ine how those expenditure disparities have eventually translated into disparities in 
the levels of service provision. The analysis of this matter is important, as it cap-
tures important dimensions of the overall picture of expenditure assignments in 
China.  
 
Horizontal disparities in total expenditure across provinces: The current sys-
tem of expenditure assignments generate pronounced expenditure disparities 
across provinces, especially for the very distinct eastern region—relatively rich, 
and the central and western regions—relatively poorer. Over time these disparities 
have not become less pronounced. In fact, before the newly established intergov-
ernmental fiscal transfers system came into effect around 1998, horizontal region-
al disparities in expenditure across provinces deteriorated (Table 4). A significant 
contributing factor has been the different revenue capacity in the different regions.  
 
The increasing trend in expenditure disparities, which was temporarily 
stopped for a few years starting in 1998 as several intergovernmental transfer pro-
grams were newly introduced by the central government, has continued its expan-
sion since 2000. Since 2003, reforms in intergovernmental transfers to improve 
rural basic public services gradually decreased the disparity levels (Table 4.)  In 
2012, public expenditures per capita in the best off province were 5.5 times larger 
                         
13
There are important issues about the long-term viability of pension funds managed at the local 
level, liabilities growing much faster than contributions and with the current population dynamic 
with prospects of things getting worse (Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez, 2006a). 
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than those for the worst off province and the coefficient of variation across prov-
inces was 0.52. These disparities are still large by international standards. 
 
Table 4. Per Capita Expenditure Disparities across Provinces: 1990-2012 
Year Min Max Mean C.V. 
1990 103.51 602.54 254.37 0.56 
1991 101.83 663.80 279.95 0.56 
1992 111.73 728.60 296.11 0.56 
1993 122.11 958.19 372.28 0.57 
1994 156.62 1452.21 444.20 0.69 
1995 225.97 1837.47 537.59 0.71 
1996 278.34 2347.97 632.31 0.72 
1997 307.66 2805.86 697.63 0.77 
1998 347.42 3210.71 810.59 0.76 
1999 409.41 3619.65 942.86 0.76 
2000 469.57 3782.24 1069.13 0.72 
2001 532.27 4245.43 1377.68 0.72 
2002 654.51 5162.67 1611.31 0.74 
2003 741.28 6163.30 1784.62 0.76 
2004 905.59 7534.20 2070.80 0.73 
2005 1165.14 8710.34 2517.68 0.71 
2006 1533.31 9142.39 2966.79 0.65 
2007 1998.52 10570.15 3706.85 0.63 
2008 2419.78 13036.26 4721.22 0.59 
2009 3062.89 15829.37 5826.63 0.55 
2010 3632.26 18306.98 6957.97 0.51 
2011 4525.80 25020.13 8799.88 0.52 
2012 5322.56 29394.16 10141.51 0.52 
Source: China statistic yearbooks 
 
Total expenditure disparities within the provinces:  There are also significant 
levels of disparity within provinces, although the trends vary over time and can 
differ significantly across provinces. Table 5 shows the disparities in total ex-
penditure per capita across counties within each province from 1995 to 2011. 
Overall, while within-provincial disparities in most of the eastern provinces have 
declined significantly, the trends in other regions have been oscillating or have 
increased slightly as in the cases of the northwest and southwest regions. On aver-
age, the coefficient of variation for per capita total expenditure within provinces 
suffered a relatively large decline over the observed period; it decreased from 1.0 
in 1995 to a value around 0.8 in 2004, and declining after to a value around 0.5 by 
2011. A closer look at the declining trends suggests that it is the provinces with 




the highest initial levels of disparities in total expenditure that registered the larg-
est drops, while the provinces with low initial levels of disparities generally expe-
rienced fewer changes in within-province disparities (Figure 4).  
 
It thus appears that if the central authorities care about reducing horizontal 
expenditure disparities, then central government policies need to take into account 
the existing horizontal expenditure disparities within the provinces and need con-
sider the best way to do that given China’s strong hierarchical vertical structure of 
government. 
 
Table 5. Per Capita Total Expenditure Disparities within Provinces,1995-
2011 
 Mean C.V. Min Max 
 1995 2004 2011 1995 2004 2011 1995 2004 2011 1995 2004 2011 
Beijing 628  4433  15685  0.4  0.3  0.3  81  2834  9918  1197  7006  25404  
Tianjin 1442  1544  7109  3.2  0.4  0.5  224  796  3727  20707  3261  14087  
Hebei 201  895  3034  1.9  1.9  0.4  66  236  1553  4900  16541  9100  
Shanxi 226  908  4530  0.3  0.4  0.3  61  287  2404  479  1806  8493  
Mongolia 340  1906  10896  1.0  0.8  0.8  101  699  3772  2661  8514  40856  
Liaoning 452  987  4843  3.0  1.3  0.4  109  268  2071  13947  12520  9658  
Jilin 261  883  5665  0.5  0.5  0.4  138  333  2278  654  2355  14224  
Heilongjiang 298  905  5064  1.5  0.8  0.8  101  343  1202  3875  6293  25123  
Shanghai 1100  6389  16686  0.6  0.3  0.3  567  2768  9443  2912  9990  26689  
Jiangsu 208  1327  5879  0.4  1.1  0.7  104  283  2993  465  9938  24113  
Zhejiang 518  1987  5809  2.8  1.2  0.5  156  666  2668  10580  20263  20713  
Anhui 148  521  3515  0.4  0.5  0.4  65  195  1518  411  1253  7917  
Fujian 287  1044  3819  0.4  1.5  0.5  126  181  1967  814  11693  10928  
Jiangxi 188  679  3713  1.0  0.3  0.4  39  298  -4071  1977  1527  11844  
Shandong 303  998  3342  3.1  1.6  0.5  83  249  1556  10172  17500  9901  
Henan 136  559  2558  0.5  0.5  0.3  58  252  1554  369  2593  6602  
Hubei 172  607  3406  0.4  0.6  0.4  86  221  198  405  2957  7154  
Hunan 183  662  2812  0.6  0.8  0.4  81  151  883  771  4552  7475  
Guangdong 309  1087  2759  0.7  1.0  0.5  114  178  1159  1050  6553  7738  
Guangxi 206  645  3382  0.3  0.8  0.4  84  253  1663  457  5150  9180  
Hainan 323  857  5855  0.5  0.3  0.3  136  443  3537  817  1510  9512  
Chongqing 167  956  5203  0.5  0.6  0.4  87  458  2761  467  2523  10399  
Sichuan 217  1076  5633  0.6  0.9  0.8  9  324  1988  712  5174  23175  
Guizhou 140  649  3408  0.5  0.4  0.3  76  347  1120  476  1802  5780  
Yunnan 341  945  4803  0.6  0.4  0.6  105  353  2185  1483  2948  25816  
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Shaanxi 177  674  5054  0.4  0.7  0.6  83  220  2146  491  3321  16764  
Gansu 226  1235  6704  1.1  2.4  1.0  87  202  2419  1626  27381  43096  
Qinghai 396  1553  14731  0.6  0.5  0.7  121  385  4641  1100  3896  51623  
Ningxia 246  1038  7570  0.5  0.4  0.2  141  630  4999  610  2345  10838  
Xinjiang 405  1364  8726  1.0  0.8  0.6  70  447  3213  3702  8241  28474  
Mean 342  1310  6073  1.0  0.8  0.5  112  510  2582  3009  7047  17423  




Figure 4. The Initial Level and Changes of within Province Total Expenditure Dis-
parity 
 
Note: changes in within-province total expenditure disparity are calculated as the difference of 
coefficient of variation of per capita county expenditure within province for the years 2011 and 
1995. 
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Figure 5. The Decomposition of Total Expenditure Disparities, 1995-2011 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook for Regional Economy, and Authors’ Calculation. 
 
Per capita total expenditure disparities within vs. across provinces: What is 
the main driving force of disparities? In order to document the relative importance 
of total expenditure disparities within provinces and across provinces in contrib-
uting to the overall expenditure disparities in the nation, we calculate the Theil 
index based on county data. This index provides a way to decompose the overall 
disparities into disparities between groups and disparities within groups. As 
shown in Figure 5, expenditure disparities are generally starker within provinces 
than across provinces, thus suggesting that expenditure disparities within provinc-
es are the main contributor to the overall expenditure disparities in the nation. 
This is related to the very different economic experience of counties within a 
province. Nevertheless, over the years, expenditure disparities within provinces 
experienced a large decrease from a value around 0.39 in 1995 to a value around 
0.11 in 2007, leading to an overall declining trend of expenditure disparities in the 
country; at the same time, expenditure disparities across provinces experienced a 
moderate increase in this same period, which is consistent with what we observed 
in Table 4.  
 
On how expenditure disparities have translated into differences in access to 
public services: Barring large asymmetric inefficiencies across jurisdictions, un-
doubtedly there has to be a link between disparities in expenditures per capita and 
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for collective welfare is access to basic services by all citizens. Our analysis be-
low focuses on the two interrelated questions of how well correlated are expendi-
ture per capita and access and service provision, and what have been the trends 
over time in disparities of service provision.  
 
Quantifying service provision is fraught with difficulties because of the multi-
dimensional nature of most services. In the analysis we focus on just several of 
the most important services (education, health, roads, and social security) and in 
particular outputs related to those services. Concentrating first just on the case of 
education, Figure 6(a) shows that there is a high correlation between real per capi-
ta provincial expenditure on education and the intermediate output measure of the 
ratio of teachers per 1,000 students in primary schools, while Figure 6(b) shows 
the trends in the coefficients of variation for both variables. Disparities, approxi-
mated by the coefficient of variation, increased steadily over the period up to 
2005 and then started a rapid decline in the subsequent years. It is not clear 
whether this change in trend is related to any particular policy such as the prov-
ince-managing-county reform but it is an indication of some convergence across 
provinces on the budgetary priority given to this basic service. Note, however, 
that a coefficient of variation of 0.8 in 2011 still denotes a high level of disparity 
in education outputs.  
 
Figure 6. Mean and Coefficient Variation of Education Expenditure Per 
Capita and Number of Teachers Per 1,000 Primary Students, 1986-2011. 
 
         Source: China Statistical Yearbooks and Authors’ Calculation. 
 











































shows a high correlation between expenditure per capita on health care and the 
outcome of  health care provision measured by the number of hospital beds per 
1,000 persons. Both expenditures per capita and output rise very fast from the ear-
ly 2000s. The coefficients of variation for the two variables start high and remain 
high until 2005, when they experience a rapid drop in levels (Figure 7(b)). Again 
a very similar story is repeated for transportation expenditures per capita and the 
output measure of length of highways per 1,000 persons. The expenditure and 
output measures appear to be highly correlated (Figure 8(a)).  In contrast to the 
cases of education and health, in the case of transportation, the coefficients of var-
iation of expenditures and road mileage exhibit great volatility over the entire pe-
riod with no particular trend (Figure 8(b)). The higher volatility may be a reflec-
tion of the lump-sum nature of road infrastructure spending.  
 
Figure 7. Mean and Coefficient Variation of Public Health Expenditure Per 
Capita and Number of Hospital Beds Per 1,000 Persons, 1986-2011. 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbooks and Authors’ Calculation. 
 
Figure 8. Mean and Coefficient Variation of Transportation Expenditure Per 
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          Source: China Statistical Yearbooks and Authors’ Calculation. 
For other functions for which sub-national governments are also responsible, 
it is generally harder to identify a quantifiable output.  Are expenditures per capita 
on those functions expected to show similar patterns? It would appear that most if 
not all functional expenditures per capita have experienced sharp increases in real 
terms over the last decade but that the disparities across provinces as measured by 
the coefficient of variation exhibit different patterns and not always showing con-
vergence. For example, Figure 9 shows the mean and coefficient variation of per 
capita social security expenditures across provinces.
14
 Overall mean expenditures 
on social security have been increasing sharply over the years but regional dis-
parities, although somewhat reduced by the 1994 TSS reform, have become vola-
tile and large in recent years. 
 
Figure 9. Mean and Coefficient Variation of Social Security Expenditure Per 
Capita, 1986-2011 
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Source: China Statistical Yearbooks and Authors' Calculation 
 
4. OPTIONS FOR THE REFORM OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM 
 
Even though in the last two decades China has made progress in some areas 
such as separating government from SOEs and re-defining the functions and re-
sponsibilities of government in the economy, as we have seen above, there are 
still significant problems from the perspective of expenditure assignments (Mar-
tinez-Vazquez, 1998). Setting up formal, stable and sound expenditure assign-
ments to clarify the responsibilities of all government levels must become a pri-
ority for reform. A clear and explicit assignment of expenditure responsibilities at 
all levels could: (1) facilitate a more efficient organization and provision of basic 
public services; (2) significantly improve the accountability of public officials to 
residents; (3) help eliminate government encroachment in the private sector; and 
(4) help to address more effectively the issues of vertical and horizontal fiscal 
disparities. In this section, we propose several directions for the possible reform 
of the system and lay out some practical guidelines for proceeding with the re-
form.  
 
4.1 Directions for the Fundamental Reform of Expenditure Assignments  
 
Achieving a stable and transparent expenditure assignment at all levels of 
government that emphasizes exclusive over concurrent responsibilities: The re-
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should emphasize where possible exclusive over concurrent responsibilities.
15
 
When concurrent responsibilities are desirable, assignments should be clarified by 
explicitly unbundling the multidimensional array of attributes that go with each 
function, including (1) actually producing a good or delivering a service; (2) 
providing or administering the service; (3) financing the service; and (4) setting 
standards, regulations, and policies for the provision of services. The assignment 
of expenditure responsibilities should be based on the right balance between de-
volution of responsibilities according to economies of scale, the internalization of 
costs, and available administrative capacity. It should allow for asymmetric ap-
proaches as a means of allowing sub-national units with greater capacity to as-
sume greater responsibilities. In addition, it will be important to improve coordi-
nating institutions across levels of government to address different interpretations 
and conflicts arising from concurrent assignments. 
 
Reassign selected expenditure responsibilities: Coming short of comprehen-
sive reform it would still be worthwhile to reform piecemeal the assignment of 
some basic social services at the sub-provincial level. In particular the financing 
and provision of social security services (pensions, disability and survivor bene-
fits, and unemployment insurance) should be completely re-centralized, at the 
provincial and/or central government levels. Variations in benefits and payroll 
contribution rates among provinces and local government, as they exist under the 
present system, are at odds with a goal of uniform standards for all Chinese citi-
zens. The present arrangements of city and county government responsibility for 
pensions has forced pooling to the prefecture and provincial level in many prov-
inces, and in general, payroll contributions are exceeding benefits in most systems. 
Meanwhile, the reassignments of the provision of social security to the upper lev-
els of government should be accompanied with an increase in the available pool 
of funds from the central government---for example in some form of equalization 




Improving the accountability of subnational governments and the quality of 
local expenditure management: Weak accountability of sub-national government 
officials to local residents remains a significant feature of China’s decentralization 
system. This leads to a less efficient public sector. The direct appointment of offi-
                         
15
 For example, in many decentralized large countries, including Australia, Brazil, Canada, the 
Russian Federation, and the U.S., there are a number of responsibilities that are exclusively as-
signed to local governments 
16
As we have just seen, even though national average expenditures per capita on most if not all 
government functions have experienced great increases over the past decades, overall disparities 
across provinces in expenditures per capita remain very high by international --and also China’s 
own historical-- standards. 




cials tends to make them mostly accountable to the upper level and central gov-
ernment authorities. The system needs to introduce adequate accountability mech-
anisms to provide incentives to sub-national governments to properly weigh 
spending on economic development versus other public services, especially those 
in the social sectors. Meanwhile, in those areas where public services generate 
larger externalities, the upper level government should focus more on direct pro-
vision of these services, as the presence of externalities would result in the subop-
timal provision of those services if they were to be supplied by the local govern-
ments. 
 
How to do it? Besides the introduction of local elections, different approaches 
are used internationally to better empower communities for increasing accounta-
bility. For example, local governance in some countries is reinforced by institu-
tions that facilitate the involvement of civil society in the delivery of public ser-
vices and for more directly participating in budget decisions.  For example, in the 
education sector, there is now evidence that community-managed schools can 
lower teacher absenteeism and improve schooling outcomes. 
 
4.2 Some Practical Guidelines for the Comprehensive Reform of Expenditure 
Assignments in China  
 
Bringing clarity on several important preliminary questions:  
(1) What should be the scope of the reform in expenditure assignments and 
privatization? A benefit of extending the scope of the reform to all activities with-
in the fiscal system is that we can identify activities at the central and sub-national 
levels that do not serve a public function and that by their nature can be better 
provided in the private sector. More specifically, the reform of expenditure as-
signments provides an excellent opportunity for the privatization of activities that 
do not belong in the public sector.  
 
(2) Decide between general assignments versus differentiating between “dele-
gated” and “own” responsibilities. In determining expenditure assignments we 
may want to make a distinction between voluntarily (or “own” responsibilities) 
versus mandatory (or “delegated”) functions of sub-national governments. That is, 
a decision needs to be made as to whether it is desirable to differentiate between 
what sub-national governments can do and what they must do. However, doing 
this is not a requirement for a clear assignment of expenditure responsibilities. 
The arrangement for paying for delegated responsibilities is typically via condi-
tional or tied grants.  
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 (3) How far to carry “exclusive” (as opposed to “concurrent”) assignments? 
Exclusive responsibility is more conducive to accountability and generally more 
efficient provision of services; however, in practice, exclusive responsibilities are 
not always possible and it may not be desirable in some cases. 
 
(4) Decide on what general approach to use, “general competence” versus 
“closed list” for expenditure responsibilities? Here the choice is between a “gen-
eral competence” approach followed by some exclusions or exceptions versus a 
“closed list” of competences. A closed list approach is more cumbersome but it 
can offer more protection to sub-national governments against encroachment by 
central or upper-level governments. Typically the question boils down to what 
level of government may have “residual powers” in case a particular (new) func-
tion does not appear in the law in the closed lists.  
 
(5) Make a choice on the legal instrument to be employed to specify expendi-
ture assignments. Because the assignment should be stable over time, especially 
given the time needed for strategic planning and capacity building, it should be in 
the law, for example the Decentralization Law or the Budget Code. It is less pref-
erable to introduce expenditure assignments in the Constitution given the difficul-
ty of making changes in this case; however, the enunciation of the general princi-
ples of expenditure assignments in the Constitution is desirable as it offers more 
certainty and protection to subnational governments. 
 
(6) Deciding on how much needs to be specified in the law and how much can 
be left to coordination through intergovernmental committees or even to interpre-
tation by the courts? No expenditure assignment can ever be detailed enough to 
preempt the need for dialog and coordination among different levels of govern-
ment, but there is the matter of the level of specificity in the law. That is, how 
much should we rely on the legal text and implementation rules vis-à-vis a more 
general text that will be subject to interpretation as we go, by practice and coordi-
nating institutions, and ultimately be left for interpretation and rulings by the 
courts of law? 
 
(7) Determining expenditure assignments at all levels or just between the cen-
tral and the “aggregated” sub-national level? When there is a single tier of gov-
ernment below the central government, the assignment of functions must cover all 
government levels. However, when there are two or more tiers of government at 
the sub-national level there are several choices of approach. An explicit assign-
ment at all levels is more transparent and efficient and therefore much preferred 
even though it would be less flexible in adapting to specific characteristics of sub-
national units. 





(8) Deciding between uniform versus asymmetric responsibilities? Some local 
jurisdictions may be too small
17
 to realize economies of scale in the delivery of 
public services. Although there are some ways to get around the small scale, such 
as privatization of services, the creation of special districts, or associations of lo-
cal governments, the most preferable solution to the problem is the amalgamation 
of smaller local governments into larger units with adequate size and capacity. 
But this solution (amalgamation) may not be politically feasible or even desirable 
in terms of accountability in the case of very dispersed populations. The solution 
could be an asymmetric assignment of expenditure responsibilities, where more 
responsibilities are assigned according to the capacity of local governments.  
 
Identifying who should be involved: It may be assumed that in the case of 
China, the determination of expenditure assignments is the prerogative of the na-
tional or central authorities. As mentioned earlier, leadership of the reform should 
be assigned to an intergovernmental reform commission with wide representation 
of the most important stakeholders at the central and subnational levels. The 
commission, with support of a technical secretariat or working group, would need 
to establish the general strategy and scope of the reform, as well as an implemen-
tation plan with an explicit time schedule. If there is no commission, perhaps the 
Ministry of Finance could take the lead in the reform effort. However, that is like-
ly to be less than ideal.  
 
Determining what different types information will be needed: Setting up to 
conduct comprehensive reform of expenditure assignments will require significant 
amounts of data on actual and potential expenditures and expenditure needs asso-
ciated with the reassignment. Getting all of this information on a timely basis may 
be one of the most significant hurdles to expenditure assignment reform. But it 
will be important that adequate resources are dedicated to this task. 
 
Enforcement:  One of the big difficulties with expenditure assignments, is the 
potential disconnect between the assignments specified in the law and regulations 
and what is actually done in practice. These problems will be reduced if the pro-
cess of reform is highly participatory, involving all stakeholders, and the reforms 
are well publicized. The added clarity to the assignment of expenditure responsi-
bilities by the reform should also contribute to reducing differences between prac-
tice and law. Intergovernmental institutions for cooperation and dialogue among 
the different levels of government can also work well in this context. 
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5. CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
China’s system of intergovernmental fiscal relations has experienced consid-
erable progress over the past three decades but, as is documented in this paper, 
significant challenges remain, especially on the side of expenditure assignments. 
In fact, the two major reforms that have been undertaken by China’s central gov-
ernment in the area of intergovernmental relations---in 1979 and 1994---were 
mainly focused on the revenue side of budget---revenue assignments and tax poli-
cy and tax administration reform. Although building a system with a sound as-
signment of expenditure responsibilities may require more time, especially in or-
der to build the necessary consensus, there is clearly a need to act.  
 
Most recently there are signals that the central authority is considering some 
potential policy changes relating to expenditure assignments. On November 12, 
2013, the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of China (CCCPC) adopted the “Decision of the CCCPC on Some Major 
Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform”. The Decision of the 
CCCPC puts forth a clear requirement to establish a system of correspondence 
between administrative authority and expenditure responsibility. It requires that 
the administrative authority and expenditure responsibility of the central govern-
ment, including those concerning national defense, foreign affairs, national securi-
ty, and unified national market rules and management will be increased. The ad-
ministrative authority over some social security programs, and the construction 
and maintenance of major trans-regional projects will be shared between the cen-
tral and the local governments.  Regional public services will remain the respon-
sibilities of local governments. The central government will delegate some ex-
penditure responsibilities to local governments and finance these with transfer 
payments. Nevertheless, so far there has been no significant improvement in the 
system. 
 
With the increase in the demand for public services associated with the fast 
process of industrialization and urbanization of the country, the lack of reform on 
expenditure assignment has resulted in a series of problems related to the efficien-
cy and equity of the system---as discussed in this paper. Obsolete and inefficient 
expenditure assignments are now becoming a major obstacle for the moderniza-
tion of the country’s fiscal system. Therefore, the setting up of a formal, stable 
and sound expenditure assignment system must become a priority for China’s fis-
cal reform at the current stage. 
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